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Introduction
The Law Commission described the state of the law 
relating to search and seizure as outdated and a mess 
in its 2007 report ‘Search and Surveillance Powers’.3 
Its comprehensive report made recommendations for a 
complete reform of the law relating to search, surveillance 
and seizure in the course of the investigation of crime or 
offending which resulted in the introduction of the Search 
and Surveillance Bill. This legislation was not without 
controversy. It was finally enacted as the Search and 
Surveillance Act 2012.
The Act is seen as an all-embracing piece of legislation. 
Its purpose is set out in s 5. It modernises the law of 
search, seizure and surveillance. It takes into account 
advances in technologies and regulates the use of 
those technologies in the process of search, seizure 
and surveillance. It emphasises the importance of the 
provisions of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, 
the Privacy Act 1993 and the Evidence Act 2006, and 
recognises that the exercise of coercive powers by the 
state should be subject to clear and principled controls. 
The Act also ensures that investigative tools are effective 
and adequate for law enforcement needs.
Prior to the Act, the law relating to search and seizure 
was framed as if most information was held in hard copy. 
The recognition of the existence of electronic information 
was partial and inadequate. This created difficulties for 
law enforcement agencies in obtaining evidence needed 
to prosecute and convict offenders. The Law Commission 
observed that a search and seizure regime that clearly 
provided for access to and preservation of computer 
based information in a form that could be used in court 
was long overdue.4 
The Law Commission devoted chapter 7, comprising 
some 43 pages to the issue of computer searches. This 
discussion is not a critique of the report although it is 
helpful in considering the rationale and the background 
for the computer and electronic search provisions of the 
Search and Surveillance Act.
The Law Commission did not consider it necessary 
for the enactment of a separate code to deal with the 
powers to obtain access to and search devices storing 
intangible evidential material and retrieving copies of 
the data. However, it suggested that a form of ‘functional 
equivalence’ should apply to search powers and 
procedures for computers. The principles underlying 
search powers and procedures relating to tangible items 
should generally apply to intangible evidential material 
with such modifications as should be necessary.5 
The Commission observed, for example, that the power 
to copy material should provide for forensic copying or 
cloning of a hard drive or a storage device containing 
information.6 The ‘use of force’ provisions should be 
adapted to provide for access to data held in a storage 
device.7 It proposed a specific provision to ensure that 
once the examination of a forensic copy of data made 
under the authority of a search power was completed the 
copy should be destroyed unless there was proper basis 
for its retention.8 Recommendations were also made to 
extend the application of a statutory requirement for a 
person to assist an enforcement officer gain access to 
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data held in or accessible from the place that is being 
searched.9 
The Commission identified the issue of remote 
searching of computers as one of the most difficult 
areas it had to deal with.10 It suggested that the power 
to execute computer searches remotely should not be 
recommended as a general law enforcement tool, nor 
was it recommended where it involved obtaining access 
to remotely stored private communications as a parallel 
power to the interception warrant regime.11 
However recommendations were made for search 
warrants to authorise enforcement officers to conduct 
remote searches:
(a) to obtain access to network computer data where it is 
accessible from a computer found at the place being 
searched;
(b) where there is no identifiable physical location where 
the data is stored – such as internet data storage 
facilities.12 
Recommendations were also made to permit cross border 
searches in those two situations where it involved publicly 
available data or where it was specifically authorised by a 
warrant.13 
In this paper I shall address the provisions of the 
Search and Surveillance Act 2012 that deal with computer 
searches and remote access searching – or it could be 
generally and popularly classified as ‘cyber searching’. 
I shall first consider the structure of the search and 
seizure provisions as they relate to data and to computer 
systems. I shall then comment upon whether or not 
these provisions provide the answer to the problems 
identified by the Law Commission. It will be argued that 
although the legislation provides generalised solutions, 
considerable care will have to be undertaken by the 
authority seeking a search warrant and the officer issuing 
a search warrant to ensure that:
(a) the warrant is properly issued,
(b) it is properly grounded in terms of the pre-requisites 
before the issue of a search warrant, and
(c) it properly describes the target or subject of the 
search.
These issues will involve, at times, a consideration of the 
way in which a particular technology operates or the use 
of programs that are employed, especially in the field of 
remote searches.
The issue of data acquisition by search can often 
involve large quantities of data some of which will be 
relevant and some irrelevant. The Act does not address 
any processes that should be undertaken in assessing 
relevance or protecting privilege, although ss 136 to 147 
of the Act address issues of privilege and confidentiality. 
This is in contrast to the procedures that are in place for 
example for examination orders.14 These are quite specific 
in terms of process and the provision of protections. 
The vexed question of remote access will be considered 
together with a discussion of issues arising in the 
context of extraterritorial searches. I shall consider the 
applicability of the ‘plain view’ doctrine as it applies to 
computer searches, and some of the problems that arise 
from Cloud based materials.
The Search and Surveillance Act 2012 
Many of the provisions in individual pieces of legislation 
relating to powers of search and seizure have now 
been subsumed into the Search and Surveillance Act 
2012. For example, the provisions relating to tracking 
devices15 are contained in Part 3 Subpart 1 of the Search 
and Surveillance Act 2012 which deals with surveillance 
device warrants. Section 337 repeals ss 198 to 200 of the 
Summary Proceedings Act.16 
What the Search and Surveillance Act 2012 does is 
bring into one place and standardises rules relating to 
searches with warrants, searches without warrants, 
powers of entry, examination orders (a form of compelled 
questioning), surveillance orders and production orders. 
Protections for privilege are provided and procedures 
are set in place for dealing with seized or produced 
materials and their disposal. There are also provisions for 
immunities.
Computer and remote access searches
Within this structure there are provisions in the Act 
dealing with computer systems searches and remote 
9 Search and Surveillance Powers: Report p 
23, para 24.
10 Search and Surveillance Powers: Report 97 p 
24, para 25.
11 Search and Surveillance Powers: Report 97 p 
24, para 25.
12 Search and Surveillance Powers: Report 97 p 
24, para 25.
13 Search and Surveillance Powers: Report 97 p 
24, para 25.
14 Search and Surveillance Act 2012, ss 33 – 43.
15 Summary Proceedings Act, ss 200A – 200P. 
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– 200P, pursuant to s 337 of the Act which 
repeals them but the transitional provisions 
are provided in s 349 relating to applications 
made before the 18 April 2012.
16 Section 348 – a transitional provision – 
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incorporates or refers to those provisions. 
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searches of ‘things’ that are authorised by a warrant. 
These provisions are contained in Part 4 of the Act dealing 
with search, surveillance and inspection powers. Remote 
searching and computer system searching take place 
within the context of Part 4 subpart 3 dealing with the 
issue of search warrants and Part 4 subpart 4 dealing with 
the carrying out of search powers. I characterise these 
general powers under the heading of ‘cyber-searches’.
Definitions
Before embarking upon a discussion of the cyber-search 
powers it is necessary to consider some of the definitions 
in the legislation. Some are identical to those contained 
in other legislation. A ‘computer system’ defined in s 3 is 
identical to the definition of a computer system contained 
in s 248 of the Crimes Act:
‘“computer system”—
(a) means—
(i) a computer; or
(ii) 2 or more interconnected computers; or
(iii) any communication links between computers 
or to remote terminals or another device; or
(iv) 2 or more interconnected computers 
combined with any communication links between 
computers or to remote terminals or any other 
device; and
(b) includes any part of the items described 
in paragraph (a) and all related input, output, 
processing, storage, software, or communication 
facilities, and stored data.’
Similarly, ‘access’ in relation to a computer system in the 
Search and Surveillance Act 2012 replicates the definition 
contained in s 248 of the Crimes Act.17 
‘Access information’ is a new definition and ‘includes 
codes, passwords, and encryption keys, and any related 
information that enables access to a computer system or 
any other starter storage device’.18 
A ‘remote access search’ is defined as ‘a search of a 
thing such as an internet data storage facility that does 
not have a physical address that a person can enter and 
search.’19 
A ‘thing’ is defined as including ‘an intangible thing 
(for example, an email address or access information to 
an internet data storage facility)’.20 Thus the reference to 
‘access information’ in the definition of a ‘thing’ must be 
cross referenced to the definition contained in s 3(1).
The Law Commission drew the distinction between 
tangible and intangible material and this is reflected in 
the definitions of the Search and Surveillance Act. If we 
consider, for example, a document – information written 
upon a piece of paper – it is quite easy for a reader 
to obtain access to that information long after it was 
created. The only thing necessary is good eye sight and 
an understanding of the language in which the document 
is written. Data in electronic format is dependent upon 
hardware and software. The data contained upon a 
medium such as a hard drive requires an interpreter to 
render it into human readable format. The interpreter 
is a combination of hardware and software. Unlike the 
paper document, the reader cannot create or manipulate 
electronic data into readable form without the proper 
hardware in the form of computers.21 
Schafer and Mason warn of the danger of thinking of 
an electronic document as an object ‘somewhere there’ 
on a computer in the same way as a hard copy book is in 
a library. They consider that the ‘e-document’ is better 
understood as a process by which otherwise unintelligible 
pieces of data are distributed over a storage medium, are 
assembled, processed and rendered legible for a human 
user. Schafer and Mason observe that in this respect the 
document as a single entity is in fact nowhere. It does 
not exist independently from the process that recreates it 
every time a user opens it on a screen.22 
Computers are useless unless the associated software 
is loaded onto the hardware. Both hardware and software 
produce additional evidence that includes, but is not 
limited to, information such as metadata and computer 
logs that may be relevant to any given file or document in 
electronic format.
This involvement of technology and machinery makes 
electronic documents paradigmatically different from 
‘traditional documents.’ It is this mediation of a set of 
technologies that enables data in electronic format – at its 
simplest, positive and negative electromagnetic impulses 
recorded upon a medium – to be rendered into human 
readable form. This gives rise to other differentiation 
17 ‘access’, in relation to any computer system, 
means instruct, communicate with, store 
data in, receive data from, or otherwise make 
use of any of the resources of the computer 
system.
18 Search and Surveillance Act 2012, s 3(1).
19 Search and Surveillance Act 2012, s 3(1).
20 Search and Surveillance Act 2012, s 97.
21 Burkhard Schafer and Stephen Mason, 
chapter 2 ‘The Characteristics of Electronic 
Evidence in Digital Format’ in Stephen 
Mason (gen ed) Electronic Evidence (3rd 
edn, LexisNexis Butterworths, London 2012) 
2.05.
22 Burkhard Schafer and Stephen Mason, 
chapter 2 ‘The Characteristics of Electronic 
Evidence in Digital Format’ 2.06.
42        Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 10 (2013) © Pario Communications Limited, 2013
issues such as whether or not there is a definitive 
representation of a particular source digital object. Much 
will depend, for example, upon the word processing 
programme or internet browser used.
I made reference in the introduction to this paper to 
the issue of ‘functional equivalence’ and perhaps the 
only way in which an electronic document may be seen 
as ‘functionally equivalent’ to a paper based document 
may be in the presentation of information in readable 
form. In the case of a Firm of Solicitors v The District Court 
Auckland,23 Heath J noted that s 198A of the Summary 
Proceedings Act 1957 was designed to deal with a paper 
based environment but that now more often than not, 
information is stored primarily in electronic form. He 
adopted a functional equivalence approach to executing a 
search warrant.
With respect I consider that ‘functional equivalence’ 
is an unhelpful concept, although to make the statute 
work in 2004, it was probably the only option available to 
Heath J. Functional equivalence can relate only to the end 
product and not to the inherent properties that underlie 
the way in which the material or information is created, 
stored, manipulated, re-presented and represented.
It is interesting that the complexity of electronic 
information is something that is capable of being 
searched for or ‘seized’ yet is described as an ‘intangible’ 
thing. The ultimate fruit of the search will be the 
representation of the information in comprehensible 
format, but what is seized is something paradigmatically 
different from mere information, the properties of 
which involve layers of information. It is clear that the 
legislation contemplates the end product – the content 
contained in the electronic data – yet the search also 
involves a number of aspects of the medium as well. 
In the ‘hardcopy’ paradigm the medium is capable 
of yielding information such as fingerprints or trace 
materials, but not to the same degree of complexity as its 
digital equivalent. Although Marshall McLuhan intended 
an entirely different interpretation of the phrase, ‘the 
medium is the message,’24 it is a truth of information in 
digital format.
The context for cyber searches – search warrants 
A search warrant may be obtained by way of an 
application.25 This discussion is not intended to cover 
the application process in any great detail other than to 
observe that the application for the warrant must contain, 
in reasonable detail:
(a) the address or other description of the place, vehicle, 
or other thing proposed to be entered or entered in 
searched, inspected, or examined, together with
(b) a description of the item or items or other evidential 
material believed to be in or on the place, vehicle, or 
other thing that is sought by the applicant.26 
Section 98 does not contain any specific provisions 
relating to what is required by way of particulars to 
support an application for a search – remote access or 
otherwise. That is left to s 103 which deals with the form 
and content of the search warrant. The search warrant 
must contain, in reasonable detail, certain particulars that 
are listed in s 103(4).
Section 103(4)(k) refers to a remote access search. If the 
warrant is intended to authorise a remote access search27 
the search warrant must contain the access information 
that identifies the thing to be searched remotely. This 
returns us to the definition of ‘access information.’ It will 
be remembered that this includes codes, passwords and 
encryption keys as well as related information enabling 
access to the computer system or any other data storage 
device. It could conceivably be said that ‘code’ could 
include a uniform resource locator or URL, a profile, a mail 
box or e-mail address or an account name which would 
then identify the ‘location’28 of the information sought.
The examples given in the definition of ‘thing’ are 
somewhat confusing because eiusdem generis29 has a 
limiting and restrictive effect rather than an expansive 
one. The definition of ‘thing’ in s 97 gives examples of an 
e-mail address or access information to an internet data 
storage facility. This may limit the possibility of an internet 
data storage facility being a ‘thing.’ But in s 103(4)(k) the 
search of the ‘thing’ is exemplified as an internet data 
storage facility not situated at a physical location. Whilst 
it is applauded that the scope of the definition of ‘thing’ is 
widened in s 103(4)(k) it is perhaps unfortunate that in the 
definition section the exemplification has a limiting effect.
Search warrants and remote access – criteria
Interestingly the criteria for the issue of a search warrant 
authorising a remote access search are contained, not in 
the material that must be placed before the issuing officer 
in an application for search warrant under s 98, but in s 
103(6). This states:
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‘An issuing officer may not issue a search warrant 
authorising the remote access search of a thing unless 
he or she is satisfied that the thing is not located at a 
physical address that a person can enter and search.’
This means that the application for the search warrant 
must contain sufficient information about the intangible 
information to establish that a remote access search 
is necessary. This is because of the absence of the 
intangible information at the physical address the subject 
of the search. A remote access search would not be 
authorised, for example, in respect of data held on a home 
computer because the home computer and the intangible 
data held upon it is present at a place, namely the home 
address. Similarly, data held on an office server located 
in business premises may be searched at the business 
address. The issue becomes more complicated if the 
business or home users are using Cloud computing, or 
data is located off site or in several servers located in one 
or more countries.
Before issuing a search warrant, the issuing officer 
would have to be satisfied that the data is not located 
at the physical address. This might mean, for example, 
that an earlier search has located information that the 
user of the computer has data located in the Cloud or on 
a remote server. This information would have to be put 
before an issuing officer to provide the basis for a remote 
access search. Alternatively, there would have to be some 
information or evidence obtained by the investigators to 
satisfy the issuing officer:
(a) that a remote access search was necessary; and
(b) that there was access information to enable the 
remote access search to be carried out.
Cyber search powers – local and remote data
I now turn to a consideration of the powers that are 
authorised in carrying out a search. These are contained 
in s 110. Interestingly, the search powers in respect 
of a document that may be lawfully seized in s 110(g) 
immediately precede the search powers in respect of 
access to a computer system or intangible material 
contained in s 110(h) – (i). One wonders whether or not 
it is coincidence that information based searches of 
different paradigms should be so closely located in the 
statutory structure.
Section 110(h) authorises a person exercising the 
search power to use any reasonable means to obtain 
access to a computer system or other data storage device 
located in whole or in part at the place, vehicle, or other 
thing if any intangible material that is the subject of the 
search may be in that computer system or other device.
It is important to note that s 110(h) deals with locally 
located data within the particular device. Section 110(i) 
enables the copying of material by means of previewing, 
cloning or other forensic methods for examination either 
before or after removal. Thus cyber-search powers set out 
in s 110 are directed towards data contained in a device 
that is located in a physical place and enables the retrieval 
or copying of that material.
Section 111 deals specifically with the remote access 
search of a thing authorised by a warrant and states:
‘Every person executing a search warrant authorising a 
remote access search may:
(a) use reasonable measures to gain access to the 
thing to be searched and
(b) if any intangible material in the thing is the subject 
of the search or may otherwise be lawfully seized 
copy that material (including by means of previewing, 
cloning or other forensic methods)’.
The use of the words ‘in the thing’ suggests that whatever 
it is that retains the data is in the nature of a ‘container.’ 
This demonstrates the difficulty in attempting to 
conceptualise locatable electronic data which may in fact 
be spread across a number of servers or hard drives.30 
Whether or not cloning would be a proper means of 
retrieving data located in a remote server in the Cloud 
is debatable. An additional problem arises as to the 
nature of the data in its raw form, and the combination of 
software and hardware that will be necessary to render 
it into meaningful information. It seems that the cyber-
search provisions of the Search and Seizure Act are 
premised upon an assumption of the availability of proper 
interpreter or rendering hardware and software which 
may make the data intelligible. As I have earlier observed, 
the data in of itself means nothing unless one is able to 
interpret binary language.
Section 112 authorises the removal of items for 
examination or analysis in certain circumstances. It 
provides as follows: 
‘If a person exercising a search power is uncertain 
30 For a consideration of analogies for a 
computer as a storage device see Chief 
Executive Ministry of Fisheries v United 
Fisheries [2010] NZCA 356, [2011] NZAR 54 
and Faisaltex Ltd v Preston Crown Court 
[2008] EWHC 2382 (Admin), [2009] 1 WLR 
1987 (DC) discussed below.
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whether any item found may lawfully be seized, and 
it is not reasonably practicable to determine whether 
that item can be seized at the place or vehicle where 
the search takes place, the person exercising the 
search power may remove the item for the purpose of 
examination or analysis to determine whether it may 
be lawfully seized’.
This raises the prospect of seizure of an item to determine 
whether or not it may be lawfully seized, and could well 
apply within the context of a computer or computer data 
prior to cloning. As will be discussed later, the effect of the 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Chief Executive Ministry 
of Fisheries v United Fisheries Limited31 will be relevant, 
along with a consideration of the ‘plain view’ provisions of 
the Search and Surveillance Act.32 
Cyber search specialist assistance and 
expertise 
There will be occasions in the course of a computer search 
where specialist expertise will be required. Section 113 
allows for people to be called upon to assist a person 
exercising a search power. The person assisting may:
‘use any reasonable measures to access a computer 
system or other data storage device located (in whole 
or in part) at the place, vehicle, or other thing if any 
intangible material that is the subject of the search 
may be in that computer system or other device.’33 
Where any intangible material accessed under paragraph 
(h) which is the subject of the search or may otherwise 
be lawfully seized, the person assisting may copy that 
material.34 Section 114 specifically addresses powers of 
persons called to assist in remote access search. These 
powers are similar to those of the person executing the 
search warrant under s 111.
Section 114 provides that every person called on to assist 
a person executing a search warrant authorising a remote 
access search may:
‘(a) use reasonable measures to gain access to the 
thing to be searched; and
(b) if any intangible material in the thing is the subject 
of the search or may otherwise be lawfully seized, 
copy that material (including by means of previewing, 
cloning, or other forensic methods).’
Obtaining access to computer systems or to remote 
access sites may have additional layers of difficulty 
arising from the need to know login names, passwords 
and encryption particulars. Section 13035 provides that a 
person exercising a search power in respect of data held 
in a computer system or other data storage may require 
a ‘specified person’ to provide access information and 
other information or assistance that is reasonable and 
necessary to allow the person exercising the search 
power to obtain access to the data. The definition of a 
‘specified person’ is contained in s 130(5).36 The specified 
person may be:
‘(a) the user of a computer system or other data 
storage device or internet site who has relevant 
knowledge of that system device or site or
(b) a person who provides an internet service or 
maintains an internet site and who holds access 
information.’
The scope of the definition of a specified person in s 
130(5)(b) is quite wide and could include an internet 
service provider who holds access information, or a 
person who maintains a particular site for data storage 
purposes and who may also have access information. 
This could cast an obligation upon an ISP or data storage 
organisation, both of whom may hold access information 
on their files, to provide that information to enable a 
remote access search or a search of a computer system.
The mere provision of access should not amount to self 
incrimination,37 but must be read subject to sub Part 5 of 
Part 4 which relates to privilege and confidentiality.
Although the term is not used in s 130, s 130(5) defines 
a ‘user’:
‘“user”, in relation to a computer system or other data 
storage device or an Internet site, means a person 
who—
(a) owns, leases, possesses, or controls the system, 
device, or site; or
(b) is entitled, by reason of an account or other 
arrangement, to access data on an Internet site; or
(c) is an employee of a person described in 
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32 Search and Surveillance Act 2012, s 123.
33 Search and Surveillance Act 2012, s 113(2)
(h).
34 Search and Surveillance Act 2012, s 113(2)(i). 
Including by means of previewing, cloning, 
or other forensic methods either before or 
after removal for examination.
35 Which, as I have earlier observed, replicates 
in substance Summary Proceedings Act, s 
198B.
36 A term or definition that was not present in 
section 198B.
37 Search and Surveillance Act 2012, s 130(2) – 
(3). See also Summary Proceedings Act 1957, 
s 198B.
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paragraph (a) or (b).’
The definition is wide although it is limited to s 130 
because it is prefaced with the words ‘in this section.’
Section 198B of the Summary Proceedings Act 
contained an offence for failing to assist in providing 
knowledge of a computer or network to assist access. A 
similar offence is provided in the Search and Surveillance 
Act 2012 in respect of a breach of s 130 and that offence 
is contained in s 178. It is an offence to fail, without 
reasonable excuse, to assist a person exercising a search 
power when requested to do so under s 30(1).
Notice of a remote access search
Notice of the fact of a remote access search will not be 
apparent to a person whose data may be the target of the 
search unless that person is present when the remote 
access search is carried out. The provisions of s 132 are 
designed to ensure that the target of a remote access 
search has been notified that a search has been carried 
out. The person conducting a remote access search must, 
when the search has been completed, send an electronic 
message to the e-mail address of the ‘thing’ being 
searched and attach a copy of the search warrant and 
provide certain particulars:
‘(i) the date and time of the commencement and 
completion of this search;
(ii) name and unique identifier of the person who had 
overall responsibility for that search;
(iii) the address of the office to which enquiries should 
be made.’38 
If the electronic message cannot be delivered or is 
returned undelivered, the person conducting the search 
has to take all reasonable steps to identify the user of the 
thing searched and send the information to that person.
The language of s 132(1) is confusing because it is 
based upon a number of assumptions. It refers to the 
‘thing’ being searched. This may be the data storage 
facility which is the subject of the remote search. It is 
highly unlikely that a Cloud based server, for example, 
would have an e-mail address. It will have an IP address. 
That does not automatically mean that such IP address 
will be associated with an e-mail account or an e-mail 
server. There may be an e-mail address associated with 
the account of the person who is using the Cloud based 
service. However, in some cases the provisions of the 
subsection may be impossible of performance because 
the thing searched may not have an e-mail address. In 
addition, notice to a ‘thing’ presumably is conflated with 
notice to a person since it will be a person who will be 
taking any action following upon a remote access search.
It would have been preferable to eliminate the 
confusion caused by the default position. Given that the 
intention of the notice is to bring the fact of a remote 
search to a person associated with the target of the 
remote access search, the requirement to ascertain that 
person, and give notice would have been a preferable 
default position.
Remote access searches and extraterritorial 
issues 
Remote access searching gives rise to jurisdictional 
issues in the case of data stored in servers situated in 
another jurisdiction. Cloud computing makes this almost 
inevitable. Some data in the Cloud may be held across a 
number of jurisdictions.
An extra territorial or cross-border search occurs when 
an enforcement agency from New Zealand obtains access 
to a computer or an address that is in another country to 
obtain evidential material in executing a domestic search 
warrant. The Law Commission suggests that jurisdictional 
issues arising as to the access to data are likely to be the 
biggest obstacle to effective remote access searches. The 
matter is further complicated by virtue of the fact that 
New Zealand is not a signatory to the Convention on Cyber 
Crime 2001 which allows for cross border assistance in 
criminal matters.39 
However New Zealand has enacted the Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1992 which is designed 
to facilitate New Zealand providing and obtaining 
international assistance in criminal matters. This includes 
obtaining evidence and executing requests for search and 
seizure. However mutual assistance would require that a 
search would have to be carried out pursuant to the laws 
of the assisting state rather than in accordance with the 
Search and Surveillance Act.
The Law Commission suggested that remote cross 
border searches should be allowed where the search is to 
open source or publicly available data regardless of where 
it is stored geographically. This presumably would not 
have privacy or information ‘ownership’ implications. In 
such a case, if data is available to the public it would not 
require a search warrant.
Cross border searching could be conducted in 
38 Section 132(1)(b).
39 The Convention on Cybercrime, ETS no 185, 
Budapest 23 November 2011.
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accordance with mutual assistance arrangements as 
has already been suggested. The third suggestion 
offered by the Law Commission suggested that cross 
border searches could be specifically authorised under 
a search warrant. In my view that raises some very 
real difficulties, especially where there are no mutual 
assistance arrangements in place. The remote access 
search may well constitute an unlawful act under the 
laws of the other state. Alternatively there may be other 
criteria that have to be fulfilled before a search may be 
lawful. For example, the United States of America has a 
developed jurisprudence based upon Fourth Amendment 
considerations which differ from those in New Zealand.
A further difficulty involves unlawful access to computer 
systems contained in provisions similar to s 252 of the 
Crimes Act 1961. Many countries have enacted, or are 
likely to enact, legislative provisions prohibiting such 
access within their borders and a remote access search 
would therefore be unlawful. A lawfully issued search 
warrant may not fulfil authorisation requirements that 
would allow access in the ‘hosting’ state.
The Law Commission acknowledged that while 
principles of territorial sovereignty should be recognised 
to the maximum extent possible, observation of such 
principles may be impossible where the identity of the 
relevant jurisdiction is unknown.
To further complicate the matter, unlawful cross border 
searches run the risk of censure by a foreign government 
and the risk that the evidential material derived from the 
search may be rendered inadmissible on the basis of 
foreign unlawfulness.
The Law Commission considered whether the approval 
of the Attorney General should be sought for a remote 
cross border search but submissions did not favour such 
precondition on the basis of uncertainty and potential 
delay and does not appear in the Act.
The suggestion that search warrant authorisation would 
cure jurisdictional problems arising in a remote cross 
border search does not, in my view, solve the problem. 
The Law Commission suggested that if a remote cross 
border search was sought a warrant application:
(a) would require disclosure of that fact,
(b) that the search was or would likely to be a cross 
border search,
(c) together with the nature of any mutual assistance 
arrangements with the relevant country if the identity 
of that country was known.
Where a warrant was issued without specific 
authorisation for a cross border search, the enforcement 
agency would have to return to the issuing officer for 
further authorisation for a cross border search. Such 
a situation might become apparent in the course of 
executing the initial search warrant. This is the preferred 
option for the Law Commission given the inconclusive 
state of international law.
In the case of Stevenson v R,40 the police applied for 
a search warrant addressed to Microsoft for records 
that were kept in the USA. The request was directed 
to Microsoft in New Zealand who forwarded it to the 
American parent. The appellant challenged the issue of 
the warrant. The court held as follows:
‘Fourth, Mr Haskett submits that the warrant issued 
against Microsoft should be ruled invalid and the 
evidence obtained from that source excluded. He 
relies on the same grounds advanced in support 
of the challenge to the search warrant, which we 
have rejected. Additionally, however, he submits 
that the warrant for Microsoft was invalid because it 
purported to authorise search in the United States 
of America. The answer to that submission is, as Mr 
Ebersohn points out, that the Summary Proceedings 
Act does not require a warrant to be limited to the New 
Zealand jurisdiction although of course it could not be 
practically enforced outside of New Zealand.’41 
Could this approach – without any developed reasoning 
– be applied under the Search and Surveillance Act 
and particularly to remote access searches? The 
determinative language of the court would suggest it 
does. A remote access warrant, like a warrant under 
the Summary Proceedings Act, is not limited to the 
New Zealand jurisdiction. But the issue of practical 
enforcement off-shore encounters a technology that 
enables the act of searching without the formal execution 
of the warrant. Technically, a remote access search can 
be carried out. The technology allows an enforcement 
officer to obtain access to a server off-shore and obtain 
the data sought. In a situation where a warrant had not 
been issued authorising such a search, such an action 
would constitute unauthorised access to a computer 
system. In such a case, because an action necessary to 
the commission of the offence had taken place in New 
Zealand, this would expose the person accessing to 
an offence against s 252 of the Crimes Act 1961. Thus, 
the issue of a remote access warrant would protect 
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the enforcement officer from any potential liability 
in New Zealand. The warrant would make lawful an 
act of ‘hacking’ that would otherwise be unlawful 
and punishable under domestic law. In addition, the 
provisions of s 132 would allow retrospective notice of the 
search to be given to the user of the thing searched. But 
does that mean that there are no implications as far as the 
‘hosting’ state is concerned? There certainly are, and the 
recipient of a s 132 notice could well raise the issue with 
the enforcement authorities in the hosting state.
These conclusions suggest that the comment in 
Stevenson needs to be revisited. The first point to note is 
that Stevenson did not deal with a remote access search 
and was directed to an entity that had a physical domestic 
presence. Secondly, the information sought may have 
been digital in nature, but would have to be retrieved 
by human intervention. A remote access search, by its 
nature does not require action on the part of the ‘thing’ 
in respect of which the search is authorised. Arising from 
that the third point is that the technology allows complex 
enforcement issues to be circumvented. The remote 
access search can be effected by use of the technology.
But just because the technology allows it, should this 
be permitted to happen? Should the issue of a search 
warrant allow an extraterritorial remote access search, 
and should the fruits thereof be admissible? A strict 
‘crime control’ approach would suggest an affirmative 
response. On the other hand a principled approach that 
recognises the broader issues of the Rule of Law must 
recognise that there is a customary international law 
prohibition on conducting investigations in the territory 
of another state.42 Remote access searches violate 
territorial integrity and, whatever the constitutional 
constraints that exist within the searching country, such 
searches are prohibited as violations of international 
law. Notwithstanding the utopian vision of a separate 
jurisdiction for cyberspace, the reality is that data has 
a physical location within the territorial jurisdiction of a 
state.
Some states have asserted that they possess a broad 
power to conduct remote cross-border searches, that is, 
to use computers within their territory to obtain access 
to and examine data physically stored outside of their 
territory, so long as the data is relevant to an investigation 
of conduct over which they have jurisdiction and their 
own law authorises the search.43 On the other hand, 
states applying a stricter interpretation of customary 
international law to remote cross-border searches need 
to use various legal assistance mechanisms to conduct 
the search, such as mutual legal assistance treaties 
or co-operation at police level. Some steps have been 
taken toward developing international instruments 
that facilitate international co-operation and mutual 
assistance and the recognition of a limited power to 
conduct cross-border searches.44 
There are compelling reasons of international comity, 
adherence to mutual assistance arrangements and 
to obligations at international law that demand that 
New Zealand take a principled approach to prohibiting 
off-shore remote access searches where no reciprocal 
arrangements are in place. Mutual assistance procedures, 
where they exist, should continue to apply. Where cross-
border searches are permitted within the scope of those 
arrangements, they should be permitted. A problem arises 
in situations where mutual assistance arrangements exist 
but are inadequate to cover cross-border searches; where 
no mutual assistance arrangements are in place; or it is 
entirely unclear which jurisdiction remotely accessible 
data is held in. The Law Commission suggests as follows:
‘Where there are no mutual assistance arrangements 
in place between New Zealand and the jurisdiction in 
which the data is held, cross-border searches should 
be permitted, provided that the search is not unlawful 
in the jurisdiction in which the data is held. It would 
be undesirable for New Zealand law to authorise 
an action that may constitute an unlawful act under 
the laws of another country. Enforcement agencies 
would therefore need to investigate any local legal 
restrictions on the accessing and searching of data 
and ensure that any remote cross-border search is 
conducted in compliance with any such restrictions. 
Where an agency concludes that a search would not be 
unlawful in the relevant jurisdiction, any other possible 
consequences should be considered, bearing in mind 
the seriousness of the offending under investigation 
and the likely attitude of the country in which the data 
is held. However, any such authority to conduct cross-
border searches would be of somewhat limited scope, 
given that many countries have enacted or are likely to 
enact legislative provisions prohibiting such access to 
computer systems within their borders.’45 
What of the situation where it is unclear in which 
jurisdiction data may be held? The Law Commission was 
42 Michael A. Sussman, ‘The Critical Challenges 
from International High-tech and Computer-
related Crime at the Millennium’ Duke 
Journal of Comparative & International Law 
Volume 9, Number 2 (Spring 1999), 451 – 
489.
43 Patricia L. Bellia, ‘Chasing Bits Across 
Borders’ (2001) University of Chicago Legal 
Forum, 35 – 101, 39.
44 For example, article 19(2) of the Convention 
on Cybercrime recommends only permitting 
remote searches within a country’s territory.
45 Search and Surveillance Powers: Report para 
7.122.
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of the view that there may be circumstances where law 
enforcement agencies should be permitted to conduct a 
search. It stated:
‘While principles of territorial sovereignty should 
be recognised to the maximum extent possible, this 
becomes impossible to observe where the identity of 
the relevant jurisdiction is unknown. To prevent law 
enforcement from investigating alleged offending 
solely because data is held in an unknown jurisdiction 
would also create an obvious incentive to hide data 
in offshore storage facilities. However, it is difficult to 
find workable parameters for cross-border searches 
in unknown jurisdictions.We considered whether 
authority should be contingent on there being no 
reason to believe that the search would constitute an 
offence under the laws of any particular jurisdiction. 
However, with the growing numbers of countries 
enacting prohibitions on the unauthorised accessing 
of computer systems this is likely to be unworkable in 
practice. We considered, alternatively, whether New 
Zealand law could be used as a benchmark. However, 
this is also unworkable in practice as a search of data 
held in New Zealand by foreign law enforcement is 
unlikely to be lawful under s 252 of the Crimes Act 
1961.’46 
The question of a remote access cross border search 
is fraught with difficulty and in my view is one where 
judges issuing search warrants should tread with extreme 
care. It may well be that the concept of ‘cyber space’ as 
a separate place confuses the issue, but the fact of the 
matter is that the data the subject of the search is located 
on a server in a foreign jurisdiction. That the data may 
be accessed remotely by an enforcement authority has 
‘physical world’ ramifications. Differing standards and 
thresholds for search together with differing approaches 
towards privacy and data security mean that there is no 
easy answer to whether a cross-border remote access 
search would be lawful and therefore whether or not the 
evidence would be admissible. There would have to be 
very clear disclosure of all issues at search warrant stage 
so that if it were found that the search was unlawful, the 
curative powers of s 30 of the Evidence Act 2006 could 
be brought into play. Otherwise the issue of a remote 
access cross border search warrant might be seen as an 
egregious act of unlawfulness that could not be cured 
by the balancing test. In closing on this topic I can only 
endorse the Law Commission recommendation that New 
Zealand accede to the Convention of Cybercrime so that 
cross-border remote access searches could be carried out 
more effectively and solidly grounded in international law.
Disposal of forensic copies
Section 161 is the final section to be considered in this 
discussion of the cyber search powers contained in 
the Act. It deals with the disposal of forensic copies. If 
a forensic copy of data held on a computer system or 
other data storage device does not contain any evidential 
material, the person making the forensic copy must 
ensure that the copy and any other copies made from it 
are deleted, erased or otherwise destroyed in a manner 
which prevents the retrieval of the copy or copies by any 
method.
If the examination of the data shows it contains a 
mixture of data that is evidential material and data that is 
not, the forensic copy of the data and any copies made of 
that copy may be retained in their entirety. The forensic 
copy and any other copies may continue to be searched if 
such a search was authorised by the search power under 
which the data was seized and copied.
Handling data retrieved
The Act does not address how forensic data, data 
retrieved as the result of a search warrant or a remote 
access search, should be handled.
The difficulty arises because computer systems, be they 
local or remote, rarely contain a single class of data. They 
may well contain a large mixture of data some of which 
may be personal, some of which may be professional, 
some of which may be confidential, some of which may be 
protected by privilege and a fraction of which may be of 
evidential significance. The cloning of a hard drive or the 
copying of a subscribers ‘space’ on a remote server will 
result in a retrieval of a mixture of such information. That 
much is recognised by s 161(2). The question is how the 
data should be handled after the search has been carried 
out, the data recovered and the investigative process is 
undertaken.
The nature of a computer in the context of search and 
seizure was considered in the case of Faisaltex Limited v 
Preston Crown Court.47 In that case Keane LJ held that an 
item could be the subject of a search warrant that may 
contain irrelevant as well as relevant material. In an effort 
to draw an analogy, a filing cabinet was offered as the 
example of a container although the court considered 
that a computer was a single thing and drew an analogy 
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with a diary. With the greatest of respect, it is unwise to 
attempt to draw analogies with paradigmatically different 
concepts. Perhaps much of the difficulty that we have 
with computer technology is that pre-digital paradigm 
terms appropriate, say, to the print technology such as 
‘document’ and ‘web page’ are used for convenience in 
the new paradigm as we struggle to develop language 
that properly reflects the new concept.
The Faisaltex approach was followed by the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal in Chief Executive Ministry of 
Fisheries v United Fisheries.48 This involved the execution 
of a search without warrant. The fruits of the search 
included some computers. Baragwanath J expressed 
concern that the wholesale cloning of the computer hard 
drives could harvest privileged information as well as non-
privileged information and a system for searching should 
protect that information. He stated, at [60]:
‘Because the evidence establishes that the computer 
did contain information that was conceivably 
privileged, I respectfully dissent from the conclusion 
of the other members of the court that it was lawful to 
clone this computer without adoption of a procedure 
to protect the privileged interest. Parliament has 
not conferred carte blanche upon fisheries officers 
but is left to the court the task of specifying how to 
balance the public interest in the enforcement of 
the law against the competing public interest in the 
preservation of the privilege. I would therefore impute 
to the legislature an intention that such protection is a 
condition precedent to a lawful cloning.’
The majority of the Court of Appeal concluded otherwise 
and took a more generous view of the nature of the 
computer and the information contained thereon. The 
starting point was based on the evidence of a forensic 
accountant who stated that computer forensic best 
practice involved preserving the electronic data contained 
within the computer from alteration or deletion by 
forensic copying or cloning.
Because of the volatile nature of electronic evidence 
this best practice step is necessary to fix the nature of the 
electronic data at a point in time. Because of the way in 
which the computer operates, important evidence such 
as date and time stamps associated with every file on the 
computer, as well as the very existence of files, could be 
altered. The cloning process provides an integrity check 
that the data cloned is identical to that which existed on 
the hard drive in the computer being examined.49 The 
court took its lead from the Faisaltex case and held that it 
follows, as with a diary or a ship’s log, that the computer 
itself is evidence and the relevance is not just in the 
diary entries but also their position in the diary or log. In 
this respect the majority seemed to be concerned with 
as much with the container as with the contents. If this 
approach is followed, and using unfortunate analogies 
which must arise from the use of the language of the 
court, it would be legitimate to take an entire filing cabinet 
or copy its entire contents before determining relevance. 
The majority did recognise and agreed with the problems 
created by legally privileged material and recognised 
the difficulties identified by Baragwanath J where legally 
privileged material was involved. A reasonable exercise of 
the search power, it was suggested, would entail taking 
steps to protect such material and an appointment of an 
independent barrister and computer expert50 were ways of 
meeting such concerns the majority observed:
‘We leave open the more complicated question of 
how the competing interests are to be resolved where 
the privacy issues are those of a particular person 
investigated or employees’.51 
 As Baragwanath J observed: 
‘Computers can be used to store a wide range of 
material including very personal information. There 
is, though, some force in the argument that many 
searches, for example those by the police, will involve 
perusal of both relevant and irrelevant material to 
find the relevant if the relevant matters likely to be 
found in a place where irrelevant material is stored. 
Where a computer is used for ordinary work purposes 
that is likely to militate against any requirement for 
precautions to protect the irrelevant’.52 
The way in which the examination should be carried out 
was left to the High Court Judge following the decision of 
the Court of Appeal.
The handling of retrieved data inevitably involves a 
consideration of the ‘plain view’ doctrine. Although the 
matter was not specifically addressed in United Fisheries, 
it is suggested that the approach of Baragwanath J and 
the involvement of third party scrutiny of recovered data 
apply to seizure of all recovered electronic data. It is to the 
issue of ‘plain view’ searches that I shall now turn.
48 [2010] NZCA 356, [2011] NZAR 54.
49 Cloning, however, is just the first step in the 
evidence recovery process.
50 It would be ideal if both skill sets could 
reside in the one person.
51 [2010] NZCA 356, [2011] NZAR 54 at [82].
52 [2010] NZCA 356, [2011] NZAR 54 at [82].
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Cyber searches and ‘plain view’
In theory a cybersearch can be carried out like any 
other search. The search is limited to information that 
is specified in the search warrant. Officers may seize 
evidential material outside the scope of the search 
warrant if it is in plain view. The same rule applies to 
digital data. The problem lies in the way in which mixed 
and largely irrelevant data may be stored on a computer 
along with material within the scope of the search 
warrant. At present the evaluation of such material is 
left to the investigating officer or those called upon 
to assist. These investigating officers may uncover 
evidence of other offending beyond the scope of the 
warrant. It could be argued that because the data is 
accessible and available (unless it is password protected 
or encrypted) it is in plain view. The issue that arises in 
such circumstances is whether or not the ‘first view’ of the 
recovered electronic data or the cloned hard drive should 
be reserved to the investigating officer or be conducted by 
a third party.
This section argues that the ‘plain view’ doctrine cannot 
and should not apply to electronic data, and that prior to 
a consideration by investigating officers, seized electronic 
data should be evaluated by an independent third party.
A cloned copy of a hard drive preserves information 
at a point in time. A difficulty lies in the way in which 
the examination of that information to locate items of 
relevance to the inquiry should be carried out. Evidence 
of matters that are not relevant to the particular inquiry, 
but that may disclose other information of interest to 
investigative bodies, may well be uncovered within the 
‘filing cabinet.’ The United Fisheries use of the ‘filing 
cabinet’ analogy provides a context, but as the discussion 
continues it will become apparent that the analogy fails 
when confronted with technical reality. 
The ‘plain view’ doctrine is the subject of s 123 of the 
Search and Surveillance Act 2012.
Section 123 and ‘plain view’ searches
Section 123 applies when an enforcement officer 
exercising a search power may seize any item or items 
that they or a person assisting may find in the course of 
carrying out the search or as the result of observations 
at the place or in the vehicle. The officer must have 
reasonable grounds to believe that they could have seized 
the items under a search warrant that could have been 
obtained under the Search and Surveillance Act or any 
other search power exercisable by them. If there is some 
uncertainty as to the legitimacy of the search or seizure 
pursuant to s 112 of the Act, the item may be seized to 
determine whether or not it may be lawfully seized. The 
power in s 123 is conditioned only by the pre-requisites 
contained in s 123(1).
There are three circumstances that are contemplated, 
namely where the enforcement officer:
(a) is exercising a search power; or
(b) is lawfully in any place or in or on any vehicle; or
(c) is conducting a lawful search of a person.
Sections 123(1)(b) and (c) relate to physical searches. 
Section 123(1)(a) involves the exercise of a search power. 
The term ‘search power’ is defined in s 3 as follows:
‘“search power” in relation to any provision in this Act, 
means—
(a) every search warrant issued under this Act or an 
enactment set out in column 2 of the Schedule to 
which that provision is applied; and
(b) every power, conferred under this Act or an 
enactment set out in column 2 of the Schedule to 
which that provision is applied, to enter and search, 
or enter and inspect or examine (without warrant) any 
place, vehicle, or other thing, or to search a person.’
It could well be that the reference in s 123 to a physical 
location automatically limits the ‘plain view’ doctrine 
to what may be seen in the place or vehicle. However, 
there are two ways in which the scope of the ‘plain 
view’ doctrine may be widened. The first is that a 
computer may be present in the place or vehicle and 
may be amendable to seizure. The second thing is that 
the definition of ‘search power’ refers to ‘other thing’ 
which may be extended to data under the definition of 
‘thing’. It is inevitable that complications will arise from 
the seizure of a computer or the cloning of a hard drive. 
These complications are arise as a result of the nature of 
electronic data storage.
Seizure of computer data
The retrieval of computer data from a computer or a 
remote access location involves retrieval of all the data. 
Although the data in its raw form is not in ‘plain view’ 
it may be rendered into plain view in its entirety by 
the utilisation of hardware and software which allows 
for the rendering of the data into readable form. If it is 
here’s the thing: the cyBer search provisions of the search and surveillance act 2012
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 10 (2013)        51© Pario Communications Limited, 2013
here’s the thing: the cyBer search provisions of the search and surveillance act 2012
accepted that in that way computer data falls into ‘plain 
view,’ it may also be seized or utilised in that it may be 
capable of being obtained by a search warrant or any 
other search power. This ‘plain view’ approach runs up 
against the cautions that were expressed by Baragwanath 
J in the United Fisheries case and could well mean that 
evidence of offending other than that immediately under 
investigation may be uncovered and subsequently 
utilised. The issue becomes one of whether ‘plain view’ 
applies.
The power to seize items under s 123 constitutes an 
exception to the general rule that items falling outside 
the ambit of a search power may not be seized. The Law 
Commission considered that the plain view exception was 
justified because:
‘… no reasonable expectation of privacy is violated by 
the application of the rule. There can be no reasonable 
privacy interest in a thing that is evidence of criminal 
offending and is discovered during a search that is 
itself being lawfully undertaken.’53 
It was accepted that law enforcement would be restricted 
if obvious evidence of criminal offending was precluded 
from seizure where no reasonable expectation of privacy 
existed.
Conducting a search of a physical filing cabinet 
pursuant to a search warrant often necessitates a close 
inspection of the cabinet’s contents in order to determine 
the existence of evidence related to the alleged offending. 
This is particularly so if the contents of the cabinet are 
predominantly documents. Nevertheless if evidence of 
other unrelated offending is found in the cabinet pursuant 
to a search warrant then such evidence could be said to 
be in plain view only if it was visible when the cabinet 
drawer was opened e.g. drug paraphernalia or perhaps 
a document recording drug transactions placed on top of 
a pile of other documents. Should evidence of offending 
outside the scope of the warrant come to light only after 
all the documents within the filing cabinet have been 
scrutinised, then such evidence was not in plain view and 
therefore not able to be seized under s 123.
At a seminar on the Act the following observation was 
made:
‘ … enforcement officers will have to be careful that 
they remain strictly within the scope of the search 
powers they are exercising, and only seize things that 
‘come to light’ incidentally. As the Law Commission 
indicates (at [3.132]), this does not mean that ‘hidden’ 
things cannot be seized, as long as they are revealed 
by a search pursuant to a warrant or a warrantless 
power already underway; what it does mean is that 
no further searching (whether to find an item or to 
discern whether it is in fact evidence of criminality) can 
occur. For this, a warrant would need to be claimed or a 
warrantless power invoked.’54 
‘Plain view’ and the scope of seizure
In its report the Law Commission discussed the 
hypothetical situation where an enforcement officer 
exercising specific search powers finds evidence of 
criminal offending outside his or her statutory jurisdiction 
e.g. a fisheries officer conducting a law enforcement 
search of a place encounters drugs or firearms.55 The Law 
Commission adopted the view that specialist enforcement 
officers should not be authorised to seize items of 
criminal offending outside their statutory jurisdiction:
‘… The adverse consequences in seizing an item 
thought to be illegal when in fact it is lawfully 
possessed are obvious. Enforcement officers with 
specialist expertise or statutory jurisdiction in only a 
specific area of the law will generally have insufficient 
knowledge to make an informed assessment that, 
in the circumstances, an item is evidential material 
relating to a criminal offence of a completely different 
nature to that with which they generally deal. Where 
they do have that expertise, discovering evidential 
material other than that for which the power is being 
exercised will largely be a matter of chance that cannot 
be captured by a statutory test. Accordingly, with one 
exception, no such power is recommended.’56 
The exception referred to concerned the seizure of 
objectionable publications, in terms of the Films, Videos 
and Publications Act Classification Act 1993, discovered 
in plain view by a customs officer in the course of lawfully 
exercising a customs search power.
The Law Commission then stated in conclusion:
‘In any case where a person is lawfully inspecting for 
regulatory/compliance purposes or searching for law 
enforcement purposes and sees an item that may be 
evidential material of a type of offence in respect of 
which he or she has no power to inspect or search, 
53 Search and Surveillance Powers: Report para 
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54 Michael Heron and Dale la Hood, Search and 
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there should be no authority to seize.
In such a case the person should let the police know 
that the item exists and where they saw it. The police 
will then have to determine how best to deal with the 
situation. The information provided may establish 
grounds to obtain a search warrant or may, in some 
circumstances, provide a basis for warrantless 
search.’57 
The recommendations of the Law Commission are now 
reflected in the statutory scheme of s 123. Accordingly 
seizure of obvious evidence of criminality is restricted 
in s 123(2) to items that the enforcement officer has 
reasonable grounds to believe could be seized by him or 
her under a search warrant that could be obtained by him 
or her or a search power exercisable by him or her.
Aside from a police officer, no person exercising an 
inspection or law enforcement power is permitted to 
seize items in plain view and reasonably believed to be 
evidence of any criminal offending unless the person 
exercising that power has jurisdiction in relation to that 
offence.
The problem with the filing cabinet analogy
Where the search power is executed in relation to the 
contents of a filing cabinet, unless the evidential material 
was in plain view when the cabinet drawers were opened, 
then any evidence of an offence outside the scope of the 
warrant found after the cabinet’s contents were removed 
and examined would not be able to be seized under s 
123. Such evidence was not in plain view since further 
‘searching’ of the cabinet’s contents was required.
It is at this point that the filing cabinet analogy breaks 
down, the reason being that when a clone is taken, it is 
tantamount to copying the entire contents of the filing 
cabinet. Electronic data is not like paper. It does not have 
physical properties akin to paper. The paper document, 
lying in ‘plain view’ in a drawer of the filing cabinet has no 
immediate electronic parallel.
The Law Commission wished to apply a plain view 
doctrine to seizures of intangible data to allow evidential 
material to be seized unrelated to the search warrant 
which comes into plain view during a computer search. 
US courts suggested technical means to limit computer 
searches to data that is reasonably likely to yield 
evidential material such as:
(a) searching by file name, directory or sub-directory; 
specifying the name or recipient of e-mail to be 
searched;
(b) specifying particular types of files to be searched;
(c) specifying use of specific key words or phrases in a 
key word search;
(d) specifying file date and time of creation; and
(e) confining the search to a specific compartment such 
as e-mail storage.58 
The Law Commission considered such an approach as 
problematic. Limiting computer searches to key words 
could produce an incomplete search because key word 
searches only operate on files containing identifiable text. 
Electronic discovery software could provide a solution. 
The Law Commission did point out that potentially 
incriminating data may not be stored as accessible text 
but stored in other formats and suggested that the 
non-standard nature of computer forensic processes 
means that controls such as search protocols would not 
be a practical requirement to supplement the warrant 
specificity requirement.59 Given the state of e-discovery 
software and the various techniques that are available, 
this suggestion is questionable. For example the use of 
hashing techniques allow for the identification of non-
textual electronic objectionable material.
In relation to tangible evidential material, the Law 
Commission’s approach was that evidence that is not 
covered by search power could only be seized if it came 
into ‘plain view’ during the course of a search, and that 
seizure of such material does not authorise the search 
of a premises for additional evidence of that or similar 
offences unless it is authorised by a statutory provision 
such as s 18 of the Misuse of Drugs Act or by obtaining a 
further warrant.
The Law Commission recommended this approach to 
intangible evidential material. The ‘plain view doctrine’ 
was predicated upon visual observation. In relation to 
computer data where ‘plain view’ would apply, would 
depend on whether the incriminating nature of the 
information was immediately apparent to the enforcement 
officer without further analysis. If the enforcement 
officer or forensic analyst sees evidential material for an 
unrelated offence during access pursuant to a search 
power and they have jurisdiction to obtain a warrant in 
respect of that offence, they may seize and retain that 
material.
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paras 3.162 – 3.163.
58 Search and Surveillance Powers: Report 97 
para 7.57.
59 Search and Surveillance Powers: Report 97 
para 7.57.
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But officers may not then search for further evidence 
of that or similar offences – by trawling through a large 
amount of data stored on a computer – without separate 
authority. Where it is necessary to scrutinise a large 
amount of data while executing a search, the purpose 
of the scrutiny should be only to identify data falling 
into the description authorised by the search power 
and such scrutiny should not be conducted at large as 
an intelligence gathering exercise. Orin Kerr suggests a 
number of steps that could be taken to limit the operation 
of the plain view doctrine:60 
(a) examining the intent of the executing officer – 
where the officer tries to look for evidence described 
by the warrant the discovered material may be seized, 
but where the officer ignores the warrant that material 
may not be seized;
(b) requiring investigators to use a targeted search 
tool;
(c) assessing the reasonableness of the search and 
allowing the plain view evidence to be seized if the 
search is considered to be reasonable, although 
this may be difficult to assess where only part of the 
forensic process is found to be unreasonable;
(d) limiting the operation of the doctrine by the type of 
offence so that plain view evidence can only be seized 
for more serious offences;
(e) discarding the plain view doctrine entirely for 
computer searches.
The Law Commission considered that the ‘plain view 
doctrine’ was necessarily limited to superficially apparent 
incriminating material which, together with the protection 
against unreasonable search and seizure afforded by s 21 
of the Bill of Rights Act, should provide sufficient limits 
on its operation in the context of computer searches. 
Where investigators seize plain view material outside the 
scope of a search power, that material will be liable to be 
rendered inadmissible unless the seizure falls within the 
parameters of the plain view doctrine.60
Of relevance will be the nature of the forensic 
operations that located the plain view material, the nature 
of the scrutiny of the plain view material to ascertain 
evidential value and whether the forensic process 
used was the most targeted process available in the 
circumstances.
It must be remembered that the s 21 protections 
afforded by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act are 
subject to the s 30 balancing test. Whilst one must 
yield diffidence to the Law Commission’s evaluation of 
the matter, once again it does seem that paradigmatic 
differences do not appear to have been taken into 
account. The concerns that are expressed about the 
limitation of search parameters and the search tools 
that are available perhaps may have been valid in 2007 
at the time when the Law Commission was carrying 
out its investigation. Improvements in technology and 
the utilisation of a wide variety of search techniques, 
particularly in the field of electronic discovery, suggest 
that it is easier today to exclude irrelevant material from 
a search than it may have been five years ago. Whatever 
the costs of new technologies may be, the hours of labour 
must be substantially reduced by the use of a technology 
which reduces the volume of material for review. Once 
again it would be necessary for an investigating officer 
to establish the applicability of the ‘plain view doctrine’ 
in the first place and in doing so would have to explain in 
some detail the search processes that were undertaken 
that indeed revealed the other incriminating material 
to be ‘in plain view.’ The defence no doubt would have 
access to expert evidence to establish alternative search 
procedures were available, or that in fact the material 
would not have come within the ‘plain view doctrine’ 
thus rendering the search unlawful. In a s 30 balancing 
analysis, the court could well revisit whether or not the 
method of discovery of the material was egregious and 
once again an examination of the technology would be 
necessary.
Imposing an intermediate layer 
A further problem arises in the assumption that the 
investigating officers have direct and immediate access 
to the data after seizure. In this respect, the imposition 
of an independent layer between the action of cloning 
the data and its assessment by an individual officer 
such as that suggested in United Fisheries is necessary. 
Although there may be significant costs associated with 
the employment of an independent barrister or computer 
expert (or both) – and it would be of advantage if both 
requirements could be present in the same person – it 
must be recognised, as was made clear by the Law 
Commission in its 2007 report and in s 5 of the Search 
and Surveillance Act and especially s 5(b),61 that new 
technologies challenge concepts that were developed in 
a different paradigm and may make such added layers 
necessary.
60 Orin S. Kerr, ‘Searches and Seizures in a 
Digital World’ Harvard Law Review Volume 
119, 2005, 531 – 585.
61 Recognising the importance of the rights 
and entitlements affirmed under the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act, the Privacy Act and 
the Evidence Act.
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US v Comprehensive Drug Testing Inc
The case of US v Comprehensive Drug Testing Inc62 is 
instructive in its approach to the ‘plain view’ doctrine in 
the context of digital material. In short, the case holds that 
the ‘plain view’ doctrine is inapplicable in such a context. 
The case warrants some detailed discussion. Kozinski 
J defined the fundamental issue as the procedures and 
safeguards that Federal courts must observe in issuing 
and administering search warrants and subpoenas for 
electronically stored information.
The background to the matter was that in 2002 the 
Federal government commenced an investigation into the 
Bay Area Lab Cooperative (BALCO) which it suspected of 
providing steroids to professional baseball players. At the 
same time the Major League Baseball Players Association 
entered into a collective bargaining agreement with Major 
League Baseball providing for suspicionless drug testing 
of all players. Comprehensive Drug Testing Inc., (CDT) 
an independent business, administered the programme 
and collected specimens from the players. During the 
BALCO investigation, Federal authorities learned of 10 
players who had tested positive in the CDT programme. 
The government secured a subpoena seeking all drug 
testing records and specimens pertaining to major league 
baseball in CDT’s possession. Unsuccessful attempts 
were made to quash the subpoena, but the government 
also obtained a warrant authorising searches CDT’s 
facilities in Long Beach. The warrant was limited to the 
records of 10 players in respect of whom the government 
had probable cause. When the warrant was executed, 
however, the government seized and promptly reviewed 
the drug testing records for hundreds of players in major 
league baseball.
Concerns were expressed by courts reviewing the 
warrants as to the process that had been undertaken 
and, with the exception of materials pertaining to the 10 
identified baseball players, the various warrants were 
quashed.
One of the precedents applying to the extent of 
searches was US v Tamura.63 Tamura was decided in 
1982, just preceding the dawn of the Information Age. All 
of the records there were on paper. The government was 
authorised to seize evidence of certain payments received 
by Tamura from among the records of Marubeni, his 
employer. A three step process was required to identify 
the materials pertaining to the payments:
(a) examining computer printouts to identify a 
transaction;
(b) locating the voucher to pertain to that payment; 
and
(c) finding the cheque that corresponded to the 
voucher.
The government agents soon realised that this process 
would take a long time unless they got help from the 
Marubeni employees who were present. The employees 
refused, so the agents seized several boxes and dozens 
of file drawers to be sorted out in their offices at their 
leisure.
The court disapproved of the wholesale seizure of 
documents and particularly the government’s failure to 
return the materials that were not the object of the search 
once they had been segregated. There was no reason to 
suppress the properly seized materials just because the 
government had taken more than was authorised by the 
warrant, but for the future the court recommended that 
in the comparatively rare instances where documents are 
so intermingled that they cannot be feasibly sorted on 
site, the government should seal and hold the documents 
pending approval by a magistrate of a further search in 
accordance with the procedures set forth in the American 
Law Institutes Model Code of pre-arraignment procedure. 
If the need for transporting the documents was known 
to the agents prior to the search, they could apply for 
specific authorisation for large scale removal of material 
which should be granted by the magistrate issuing the 
warrant only where on site sorting is not possible and no 
other practical alternative exists.
In response to the suggestion in Tamura, the 
government in Comprehensive Drug Testing did seek 
advance authorisation for sorting and segregating off 
site, but once the items are seized the requirement of the 
warrant that any seized items not covered by the warrant 
be first screened and segregated by computer personal 
was completely ignored.
In answer to the objection raised about Tamura, 
the government argued that it did comply with the 
procedures, and it was not required to return any data 
it found showing steroid use by other baseball players 
because that evidence was in ‘plain view’ once the 
government agents had examined the directory. The ‘plain 
view’ doctrine negated any obligations under Tamura to 
return the property.
Kozinski J emphasised that the point of the Tamura 
procedures is to maintain the privacy of materials that 
are intermingled with seizeable materials, and to avoid 
turning a limited search for particular information into 
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a general search of office file systems and computer 
databases:
‘If the government can’t be sure whether data may 
be concealed, compressed, erased or booby trapped 
without carefully examining the contents of every file 
– and we have no cavil with this general proposition 
– then everything the government chooses to seize 
will, under this theory, automatically come into plain 
view. Since the government agents ultimately decide 
how much to actually take, this will create a powerful 
incentive for them to seize more rather than less: why 
stop at the list of all baseball players when you can 
seize the entire … directory? Why just that directory 
and not the entire hard drive? Why just this computer 
and not the one in the next room and the next room 
after that? Can’t find the computer? Seize the zip 
discs under the bed in the room where the computer 
once might have been. See United States v Hill 322 
F.Supp.2d 1081 (CD Cal 2004). Let’s take everything 
back to the lab, have a good look around it and see 
what we might stumble upon. This would make a 
mockery of Tamura and render the carefully crafted 
safe guards in the Central District warrant annulity. 
All three Judges below rejected this construction with 
good reason.’64 
To avoid a reoccurrence, the court considered that, ‘… 
magistrate judges should insist that the government 
forswear reliance on the plain view doctrine. They should 
also require the government to forswear reliance on 
any similar doctrine that would allow retention of data 
obtained only because the government was required to 
segregate seizable from non-seizable data.’65 If consent 
to such a waiver is not forthcoming the court said that 
the Magistrate Judge should order that the seizable and 
nonseizable data be separated by an independent third 
party under the supervision of the court, or deny the 
warrant altogether.
In addition, while it is perfectly appropriate for the 
warrant application to acquaint the issuing judicial officer 
with the theoretical risks of concealment and destruction 
of evidence, the court noted that the government must 
also fairly disclose the actual degree of such risks in the 
case presented to the judicial officer. In Comprehensive, 
for example, the warrant application presented to one 
judge discussed the numerous theoretical risks that 
the data might be destroyed, but failed to mention that 
Comprehensive Drug Testing had agreed to keep the 
data intact until its motion to quash the subpoena could 
be ruled on by the Northern California District Court, and 
that the United States Attorney’s office had accepted 
this representation. This omission created the false 
impression that unless the data was seized at once it 
would be lost.
Finally, the court held that the process of sorting, 
segregating, decoding and otherwise separating seizable 
data (as defined by the warrant) from all other data 
must be designed to achieve that purpose and that 
purpose only. Thus the government was allowed to 
seize information pertaining to 10 names, and the search 
protocol must be designed to discover data pertaining 
to those names only, not to others, and not to those 
pertaining to other illegality. The court observed that 
the government has sophisticated hashing tools at its 
disposal that allow the identification of well known illegal 
files (such as child pornography) without actually opening 
the files themselves. These and similar search tools 
could not be used without specific authorisation and the 
warrant, and such permission may only be given if there is 
probable cause to believe that such files can be found on 
the electronic medium seized.66 
The case also noted that the government failed 
to comply with another important procedure that 
was specified in the warrant – namely that computer 
personnel conduct the initial review of seized data and 
segregate materials which was not the object of a warrant 
for return to their owner.
The court suggested that warrant applications should 
normally include, or the issuing judicial officer should 
insert, the protocol for preventing agents involved in 
the investigation from examining or obtaining any data 
other than that for which probable cause is shown. 
The procedure might involve a requirement that the 
segregation be done by specially trained computer 
personnel who are not involved in the investigation and 
it should be made clear that only those personnel may 
examine and segregate the data.
Furthermore, those computer personnel should not 
communicate any information they learn during the 
segregation process without further approval of the 
court. But in the discretion of the issuing judicial officer, 
and depending upon the nature and sensitivity of the 
privacy interests involved, computer personnel may be 
government employees or independent third parties not 
affiliated with the government. The court suggested that 
the issuing judicial officer may appoint an independent 
expert or special master to conduct or supervise the 
64 US v Comprehensive Drug Testing 621 F.3d. 
1162 (9th Cir. 2010) at 1171.
65 US v Comprehensive Drug Testing, 621 F.3d. 
1162 (9th Cir. 2010) at 1178.
66 US v Comprehensive Drug Testing, 621 F.3d. 
1162 (9th Cir. 2010) at 1179.
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segregation and redaction of the data. In a case such as 
Comprehensive, where the party subject to the warrant 
is not suspected of any crime, and where the privacy 
interests of numerous other parties who are not under 
suspicion of criminal wrong doing or implicated by the 
search, the presumption should be that the segregation 
of data would be conducted by or under the close 
supervision of an independent third party selected by the 
court.
Only when the data has been segregated and, if 
necessary, redacted may government agents involved in 
the investigation examine only the information covered 
by the terms of the warrant. The court suggested that 
any remaining copies should be destroyed or at least so 
long as they may be lawfully possessed by the party from 
whom they were seized returned along with the actual 
physical medium that may have been seized such as the 
hard drive or computer.
Kozinski J also made some useful observations about 
information in the digital paradigm. He said that the case 
well illustrates both the challenges faced by modern 
law enforcement in retrieving information that needs 
to pursue and prosecute wrong doers and the threat to 
the privacy of innocent parties from a vigorous criminal 
investigation. At the time of Tamura, most individuals and 
enterprises kept records in their filing cabinets or similar 
facilities. Today, the same kind of data is usually stored 
electronically, often far from the premises. Electronic 
storage facilities intermingle data, making them difficult 
to retrieve without a thorough understanding of the 
filing and classification systems used – something that 
can only be determined by closely analysing the data in 
a controlled environment. Tamura involved a few dozen 
boxes and was considered a broad seizure; but even 
inexpensive electronic storage media today can store the 
equivalent of millions of pages of information.
The court made the following final summary of its 
holdings:
1. Magistrates should insist that the government 
waive reliance upon the plain view doctrine and digital 
evidence cases.
2. Segregation and redaction must be either done by 
specialised personnel or an independent third party. If 
the segregation is to be done by government computer 
personnel it must agree in the warrant application 
that the computer personnel will not disclose to the 
investigators any information other than that which is 
the target of the warrant.
3. Warrants and subpoenas must disclose the actual 
risks of destruction of information as well as prior 
efforts to seize that information in other judicial foray.
4. The government search protocol must be designed 
to uncover only the information for which it has 
probable cause, and only that information may be 
examined by the case agents.
5. The government must destroy or, if the recipient may 
lawfully possess it, return nonresponsive data, keeping 
the issuing magistrate informed about when it has 
done so and what it has kept.
Although the decision in Comprehensive has its basis 
in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the issue of the 
extent of material that is available in electronic storage 
devices and the way in which that should be dealt 
with in the context of a limited enquiry authorised by 
a search warrant is common throughout the common 
law world. It may well be that the ‘plain view’ doctrine 
may be of limited utility, and should be restricted to 
physical searches. It bears repeating that the new digital 
paradigm contains challenges for established processes 
and assumptions. The ‘different’ nature of digital data 
is recognised in United Fisheries and the suggestion 
by Baragwanath J that an independent assessor stand 
between the seizure of data and its examination for 
evidential material is mirrored in Comprehensive. 
However, the latter decisions emphasises the scrutiny 
that must be applied by issuing officers to applications for 
electronic data searches.
Some further thoughts on the cyber search 
regime 
The technology must be understood not only in terms 
of developing the evidence which may arise from this 
search, but in terms of providing the basis for the search 
in the first place. The difficulties that may attend upon 
providing the basis for a remote access search have 
already be covered. It will be remembered that a search 
warrant authorising a remote access search cannot be 
issued unless the issuing officer is satisfied that the target 
of the search is not located at the physical address that 
can be entered and searched.
The following scenario may demonstrate the course of 
action that must be followed. Enforcement officers obtain 
a search warrant to search premises including computers 
located on the premises. A search of the computers 
located upon the premises may reveal evidence of data 
held at a remote location – say in the Cloud. This evidence 
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could not be uncovered at the scene of the search. Best 
practice dictates that officers do not use the computer 
itself, but rather take a forensic clone of the data. On the 
basis of the information contained from the search of 
the computer, an enforcement officer could approach an 
issuing officer and seek a remote access search on the 
basis of the evidence from the clone of the computer. 
Alternatively, the enforcement authorities would have to 
have some kind of information to suggest that data was 
located remotely to justify a remote access search without 
embarking upon the first step suggested above.
An issue is whether an application for a search warrant 
for premises containing computers might also include 
remote access application on the basis of speculation 
that a thing is not located at a physical address that can 
be entered and searched. On a rigorous interpretation 
of s 103(6), that could not happen. It would seem to be 
necessary that it would have to be established that the 
data is located elsewhere. This does not prevent the 
police from searching the computer, cell phone, iPad, or 
other device to establish the fact of remote location of 
data.
It therefore seems that it is a necessary precondition 
that to establish evidence of remote location of data, 
there be a search carried out of local physical and tangible 
computer systems in the first place. This will probably 
apply in the majority of cases.
An interesting issue might arise if a suspect uses a cell 
telephone to obtain access to a web based e-mail account 
and the police believe that the e-mail relates to an 
offence. The police can obtain a search warrant to search 
the cell telephone even if the data is stored elsewhere. 
It may well be that a copy of the data is located on the 
cell telephone. In such a case, the data would not be in 
a remote location and a remote access search would not 
be required. If it is established that it is possible to obtain 
access to an e-mail account through the cell telephone, 
but a copy of the incriminating e-mail is not located on the 
cell telephone itself, and is located in a web based e-mail 
account such as Gmail or Outlook.com (the successor 
to Hotmail) and access to the mail account requires a 
password, under s 111 the police may use reasonable 
measures to gain access to the remote e-mail account – 
presuming a remote access search – or alternatively may 
invoke the provisions of s 130 to obtain the password to 
obtain access to the account, thus circumventing the need 
for a remote access warrant.
If the suspect destroys the cell telephone, the police 
still could obtain a search warrant to obtain access to 
the web based e-mail account via a computer and use 
reasonable measures to obtain the password, as long as 
the URL or web e-mail address can be identified as the 
thing to be searched. In such a case, it is arguable that a 
remote access search would be necessary.
However, a further problem arises in the case of Cloud 
based services. Two Cloud based services that are 
available allow for the retention of data upon the hard 
drive of a local computer as well as retention of data 
on the Cloud based servers. It all depends on how the 
customer specifies the way in which the Cloud service is 
to operate.
One such service – Dropbox – allows for all of the 
files held on the Cloud servers to be ‘mirrored’ on any 
of the computers where the user may have that the 
Dropbox utility installed upon them. For example I have 
a Dropbox account with Dropbox.com where I store 
personal documents. I have a desk top computer in my 
home office that has the Dropbox utility installed upon 
it and is configured to update any changes to any of my 
documents in Dropbox located in the Cloud. I also have 
a desk top computer at my place of business which has 
the Dropbox utility installed and similarly updates any 
changes to documents. I have a laptop computer that has 
internet access and has the Dropbox utility installed upon 
it and is configured to update. If I change a document on 
my laptop computer that is in the local Dropbox folder, 
it will automatically update and store the document at 
Dropbox.com in the Cloud. When I turn on either of my 
desk top computers that document will automatically 
be updated in the Dropbox folder on that computer. It 
would, in those circumstances, be unnecessary to obtain 
a remote access search to Dropbox.com because all of the 
files are mirrored on both of the desk top computers and 
the laptop.
However, if I configure the Dropbox account in such a 
way that files are not mirrored on my desk top computers 
and my laptop, but are held only in the Dropbox account 
in the Cloud, it would be necessary to obtain a remote 
access search to obtain copies of the documents at 
Dropbox.com in the Cloud. An investigating officer 
applying for a search warrant would have to satisfy the 
issuing officer that my utilisation of Dropbox did not 
include mirroring of the files on a local computer before 
being able to obtain a remote access search. To obtain 
a remote access search upon an initial application for 
a search warrant would require some fairly specific 
evidence about my use of computers and the way in which 
I utilise my Dropbox account to fulfil the requirements of 
s 103(6).
A similar difficulty arises with the Cloud based service 
offered by Evernote.67 Once again, the way in which 
Evernote works depends upon the way in which the 
67 http://evernote.com/.
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user configures it. I can hold copies of all of my Evernote 
documents on my desk top computer and effectively 
mirror everything that I have in the Cloud. Alternatively, 
I can hold the headers or descriptions of the documents 
held on the Evernote server without the content and may 
from time to time download onto my local computer those 
documents held by Evernote in the Cloud that I want to 
use at a particular time.
If an investigating officer were to execute a search 
warrant of my desk top computer and locate a reference 
to my use of Evernote, he may well discover the index 
of specific documents held by Evernote in the Cloud. 
The investigating officer may well be able to go further 
and identify from the index only the documents that are 
relevant to the particular inquiry and it would not be 
necessary for a complete download of all documents held 
in my Evernote account. In such a case, the investigating 
officer may be able to go back to the issuing officer 
and seek a remote access warrant in respect of those 
particular relevant documents. This would mean that the 
difficulties encountered by a complete clone of a hard 
drive and the concerns expressed in the United Fisheries 
case would not arise.
These are but two examples of a large number of 
Cloud based utilities that are available on the internet. 
They demonstrate the care with which investigating 
officers must justify and issuing officers must scrutinise 
applications for remote access warrants. It is my tentative 
view that it would be necessary for an investigating officer 
to provide information in some detail of the nature of 
the remote service the subject of the search order and 
particularly, if it involves Cloud based facilities, details of 
how the particular Cloud based service works. It should 
be relatively straight forward if the information is the fruit 
of a search of a local computer that reveals evidence of 
utilisation of a Cloud based or remote facility. However, it 
does seem at this stage that unless there is clear evidence 
of the way in which remote facilities are utilised, that 
remote access warrants will probably be consequential 
upon a local search rather than falling within the ambit of 
an initial application for a search warrant.
Conclusion 
This discussion demonstrates the difficulties that 
arise with applying physical concepts of search to the 
intangible environment of the digital paradigm and 
the internet. It is helpful that the legislation provides 
guidelines within which searches take place, but it will 
probably become clear from this discussion that the 
provisions in the legislation are broad in their approach 
and will probably be tested over time. What is obvious is 
that a knowledge and understanding of the technology 
will be required not only of applying officers but also of 
those judicial officers issuing search warrants.
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